📺 A Japanese TV giant just spent $1.5 billion buying back its own shares—not to reward investors, but to push out an activist billionaire.
Fuji Media Holdings, parent company of Fuji Television (one of Japan's "Big Five" broadcasters), completed a massive share buyback on February 5, 2026, effectively ending a year-long corporate battle with legendary activist investor Yoshiaki Murakami. But this isn't just a finance story—it's a turning point for how Japanese media companies are governed, and it raises a fascinating question: Can a TV network survive by ditching its most profitable business?
What Happened: The $1.5 Billion Buyback
On February 5, 2026, Fuji Media Holdings (FMH) completed a share repurchase of approximately $1.5 billion (¥234.9 billion), acquiring 61.21 million shares at $24.45 (¥3,839) per share through an off-market transaction on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. This represents roughly one-third of all outstanding shares—an enormous buyback by any standard, equivalent to more than 40% of the company's entire market capitalization before the announcement.
The money came primarily from a $1.46 billion (¥230 billion) loan from Mizuho Bank, to be repaid within one year at a variable interest rate. In other words, Fuji Media borrowed heavily to buy out its most aggressive shareholders.
The Players: Who Is Yoshiaki Murakami?
To understand this story, you need to know about Yoshiaki Murakami—often called Japan's original "activist investor" (物言う株主 / mono-iu kabunushi, literally "shareholders who speak up").
In the early 2000s, Murakami pioneered Western-style shareholder activism in Japan, a country where corporate culture traditionally prioritized harmony and consensus over confrontational investor demands. He was convicted of insider trading in 2006 and his original fund dissolved, but he re-emerged through entities including Reno Inc., run alongside his daughter Aya Nomura.
Starting in early 2025, Murakami's group began aggressively buying FMH shares, eventually amassing a 17.33% stake worth roughly $700 million—making them the company's largest shareholder. Their timing was strategic: Fuji Television was reeling from a harassment scandal that erupted in late 2024, sending advertising revenues plummeting and exposing deep governance failures.
Murakami's demand was straightforward: spin off or sell Fuji Media's lucrative real estate division to unlock shareholder value. When the company resisted, Nomura threatened to increase their holdings to 33.3%—the maximum allowed under Japan's Broadcasting Act for a single shareholder group.
Why Real Estate? The "Fuji Is Actually a Property Company" Problem
Here's where the story gets interesting. Despite being known as a TV broadcaster, Fuji Media's real estate and urban development arm (which includes subsidiary Sankei Building) had become the group's most reliable profit engine.
In fiscal year 2024, the media and content segment generated about $2.58 billion (¥404.3 billion) in revenue, while the urban development and tourism segment brought in $898 million (¥140.9 billion). The revenue gap looks significant, but the real estate business boasted an operating margin exceeding 17%, while the media side struggled to reach even 4%.
This mismatch created what finance professionals call a "conglomerate discount" (コングロマリット・ディスカウント)—investors valued the combined company at less than the sum of its parts because two unrelated businesses were bundled together. For years, a common joke in Japanese financial circles was that "Fuji Television is actually a real estate company" (フジテレビは実は不動産会社).
The Deal: A Mutual Exit
After months of intense dialogue, both sides reached an agreement on February 3, 2026:
Fuji Media's concessions:
- Execute the massive share buyback, effectively buying out Murakami's entire position
- Begin exploring the introduction of external capital into its real estate business—with full divestiture explicitly "not excluded" as an option
- Upward revision of full-year earnings forecasts
Murakami side's concessions:
- Withdraw the large-scale acquisition proposal
- Sell all holdings through the buyback
CEO Kenji Shimizu framed the outcome diplomatically, stating that while both parties had different perspectives, they shared a commitment to "enhancing corporate value." He also announced that advertising revenues had recovered to approximately 80% of pre-scandal levels by Q3, reaching 93% in January 2026, with a target of full recovery by April.
Market Reaction: Not Everyone Is Celebrating
The stock market's response was telling. On February 4—the day after the announcement—FMH shares plunged as much as 12% intraday before closing 3% lower at ¥3,839 ($24.45). Traders were grappling with several concerns.
First, while the buyback removes activist pressure, it also saddles the company with significant debt. Second, and more fundamentally, the deal raises questions about FMH's growth strategy. With the potential loss of its most profitable division, how will a company in the structurally declining traditional TV industry generate future growth?
U.S. fund Dalton Investments, which had separately been pushing for corporate reforms and had built a 5.83% position, also participated in the buyback. However, Dalton had been even more aggressive in its demands, having proposed a slate of 12 new board nominees the previous year.
The Bigger Picture: Japan's Corporate Governance Revolution
This story reflects a broader transformation in Japanese corporate culture. For decades, Japanese companies were known for prioritizing stability over shareholder returns—maintaining cross-shareholdings (株式持ち合い / kabushiki mochiawase), keeping vast cash reserves, and operating sprawling conglomerates with little regard for capital efficiency.
That era is ending. The Tokyo Stock Exchange's 2023 directive urging companies trading below book value to improve capital efficiency emboldened activists. Meanwhile, government-backed reforms—including new tax-free spinoff rules—have given shareholders powerful new tools.
The Fuji Media case represents one of the most dramatic examples yet. A media conglomerate was essentially forced to restructure by an activist investor who exploited a governance crisis. Whether Murakami's tactics were opportunistic or genuinely beneficial for corporate Japan is hotly debated, but the outcome is clear: even Japan's most established companies are no longer immune to shareholder pressure.
What Comes Next for Fuji Media?
With the activist investors gone and the real estate business potentially on the chopping block, Fuji Media faces a pivotal question: can it rebuild as a pure content company?
The challenge is enormous. Traditional TV viewership in Japan continues to decline as streaming platforms like Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, and domestic services like TVer gain ground. Fuji Television's ad revenue, though recovering, was significantly damaged by the 2024 scandal.
On the positive side, FMH has shown signs of strategic ambition. The company recently secured F1 broadcasting rights and has had success with major film franchises. CEO Shimizu has signaled a shift from being a "landlord" to a "content creator"—but whether the market will be patient enough to see this transformation through remains uncertain.
The $1.5 billion borrowed for this buyback needs to be repaid within a year, and the eventual real estate divestiture proceeds will be critical to funding the content-focused strategy. In the meantime, the company must prove that a Japanese broadcaster can thrive in the streaming age without a real estate safety net.
This story touches on themes that resonate far beyond Japan—activist investing, corporate governance reform, and the future of traditional media in the digital age. How are legacy media companies being transformed by shareholder pressure in your country? Are activist investors a force for positive change, or opportunistic raiders? We'd love to hear your perspective.
References
- https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2026/02/03/companies/fuji-media-buyback-activist-repel/
- https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2026/02/04/companies/fuji-media-buyback-activist-repel/
- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-03/fuji-media-announces-1-5-billion-buyback-activists-may-exit
- https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUC051A10V00C26A2000000/
- https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUC047TS0U6A200C2000000/
Reactions in Japan
Borrowing $1.46 billion for a share buyback... Mizuho made a bold move too. But the fact this loan was approved shows just how valuable Fuji's real estate assets are as collateral.
In the end, Murakami won. Bought low, sold high, and got the company to meet his demands. Activist investing is something else.
If they ditch the real estate arm, what does Fuji live on? Drama ratings are already struggling. They can't beat Netflix in streaming. Honestly, I'm just worried.
As a regular shareholder, my feelings are mixed. A buyback should boost the stock price, but the 12% drop basically says the market thinks Fuji is in trouble without real estate.
Fuji TV's old slogan was 'If it's not fun, it's not TV.' Somewhere along the way it became 'If there's no real estate, it's not a company.' Lol.
From a corporate governance perspective, this is a step in the right direction. The old regime that allowed the scandal to fester needed external pressure to change—and that's the real problem.
Murakami bought at around ¥2,700 and sold everything at ¥3,839. Estimated profit: $280 million. Behind the pretty words about 'enhancing corporate value' lies this reality of capitalizing on scandal.
I work in TV and this isn't just Fuji's problem. Regional stations are in even worse shape. If activists target them, the same thing will happen.
Broadcasting law limits foreign voting rights to 33.3%, but that also means they can freely buy up to that point. Maybe it's time for a fundamental review of broadcasting regulations.
Credit where it's due—getting F1 rights and hitting with movies is good. The question is whether that can fill the hole left by real estate. Making money from content is easier said than done.
Honestly, if the Tokyo Stock Exchange hadn't pushed for PBR improvement, Murakami wouldn't have been this aggressive. Regulatory reform is definitely giving activists tailwind.
The Odaiba headquarters was famous as a tourist spot too. If they sell the real estate, will that building eventually belong to someone else? Kind of sad.
Saw that Sankei Building started a big condo project near TSMC in Kumamoto. Smart to ride the semiconductor boom, but they're letting that go? Questionable management decision.
Hankyu Hanshin HD was also targeted by Murakami and eventually shifted to dialogue. Fuji is the latest iteration of this pattern. How long can Japanese companies withstand 'pressure disguised as dialogue'?
If 'scandal → stock drop → activist entry → management reform' becomes a template, it might actually be healthy for corporate Japan as a whole. Painful, but necessary.
Watched CEO Shimizu's press conference. He looked exhausted. Can't blame him—dealing with a scandal, fighting activists, and recovering earnings all at once. That's way too much for anyone.
As a Wall Street analyst, financing a buyback this large with debt is extremely aggressive. I'm amazed Murakami can have this much impact on Japanese corporate culture. Unthinkable a decade ago.
France has similar stories—Bolloré Group's media acquisition battles, for instance. But Japan's broadcasting law restrictions on foreign ownership make the situation unique. Balancing media independence with shareholder rights is a universal challenge.
Reminds me of the ITV restructuring and Channel 4 privatization debate in the UK. Selling real estate to focus on core business makes sense, but surviving on that alone in a shrinking ad market is another question entirely.
Korean broadcasters are increasingly targeted by activists too, like CJ Group. But K-content's global success on Netflix keeps Korean media stocks relatively strong. If Fuji wants to compete on content, overseas expansion is key.
Being honest from an investor perspective, the 12% drop was expected. Fuji without real estate has a hard growth story to tell. Disney+ and Netflix are already too strong in streaming, and local content alone has its limits.
In India, telecom-media convergence is advancing with Reliance's JioCinema/Viacom18. Japan should push more integration between SoftBank/KDDI and media companies. Clinging to the traditional broadcast model has no future.
In Germany, public and private broadcasters have clearly defined roles. The idea of a media giant also holding massive real estate assets seems strange to me. If anything, the conglomerate breakup is overdue.
Australia's Nine Entertainment also had the property angle with Domain Holdings (ex-Fairfax). Media + real estate seems odd globally, yet it works for a while. But it's never permanent.
In Latin America, Televisa (Mexico) merged with Univision to form TelevisaUnivision. Legacy broadcasters need bold restructuring to survive. Fuji is at the same crossroads.
Whether you see activists as 'vultures' or 'reformers' depends on your position. But given that scandal-plagued management couldn't reform itself, external pressure was clearly needed.
Chinese media companies are mostly state-owned, so shareholder activism is a different world. But Japan's case offers lessons in governance transparency. Open shareholder dialogue is a sign of a healthy market.
Sweden's Bonnier Group is a successful example of media diversification. Divesting real estate is fine, but you need replacement revenue streams or you hollow out. Does Fuji have that vision? I'm skeptical.
Views on Murakami's methods are divided, but combined with TSE reforms, Japanese corporate governance is undeniably changing. As an overseas investor, this trend increases my appetite for Japanese equities.