In May 2025, two months before Junglia Okinawa opened, Tsuyoshi Morioka told Reuters that his own calculations put the park's odds of success above 70%. On October 30, 2026, the executive who runs it faced reporters in Naha and admitted the park had opened before it was ready. The final responsibility, he said, was his. He also said his company would keep pressing Katana, the firm that planned the park, on its share of the blame.

Junglia is a nature-themed park on a former golf course in northern Okinawa, with dinosaur rides, a hot-air balloon and a spa. It opened on July 25, 2025, at a total project cost of about 70 billion yen ($445 million). Morioka, Katana's chief executive, is known in Japan for turning around Universal Studios Japan. We have already covered how the park's reputation slid in its first months.

What the CEO Admitted

Japan Entertainment (JE), which operates the park, reported revenue of 10.3 billion yen ($65 million) for the year to June 2026 and a net loss of 8.9 billion yen ($57 million). Its parent, Japan Entertainment Holdings (JEHD), lost 17.3 billion yen ($110 million), a figure swollen by a write-down of its JE shares. (Dollar figures use 157.37 yen to the dollar, the rate on October 30, 2026.)

Takeshi Kato, JE's CEO, who also heads the parent company, told the press conference that operations and heat measures had not been sufficiently ready at opening. Among the causes, he listed a gap between expectations and experience that wore down "destination demand" from people coming to Okinawa for Junglia itself, slow work on "stop-by demand" from tourists pairing it with sights like the Okinawa Churaumi Aquarium, and slow cost cuts. The company saw advance ticket sales slipping around September 2025, he said.

In April 2026, some of the original lenders put in another 2 billion yen ($13 million). In October, the Okinawa Development Finance Corporation, a state-owned lender, added 3 billion yen ($19 million) as a bridge loan, on condition that it be repaid ahead of other creditors, according to the Yomiuri Shimbun. Kato called new equity indispensable and said no negotiation has been finalized. As of October 2026, the Yomiuri reported that several companies were interested, with a decision targeted for February 2027.

"70%" and "100% Private"

In that Reuters interview, Morioka, who calls himself a maths nerd, said Junglia could be profitable even with half the visitors of the nearby Churaumi Aquarium, which draws about 3 million a year. The Reuters article also quoted the chairman of the Amusement Park Society of Japan, who gave the park almost no chance of long-term success.

The forecasting story had already drawn public money. On September 28, 2022, the Cool Japan Fund, a public-private fund, announced an 8 billion yen ($51 million) investment in Katana. Its press release praised Katana for having a highly accurate demand forecasting model. That money went to Katana, not directly to the park's operator. The fund itself is now heading for closure, as we reported.

The park's own funding was planned as half equity and half debt. According to Nikkei BOOK Plus, 13 lenders put together a 36.6 billion yen ($233 million) syndicated loan in August 2022. During that scramble, Shoko Chukin Bank, one of the lead arrangers, suggested bringing in state money if fundraising stalled. Morioka and Kato refused. Kato said it absolutely had to be a business built on 100% private investment.

Of the original 36.6 billion yen, the Okinawa Development Finance Corporation provided 10 billion yen ($64 million), according to the Ryukyu Shimpo. The same state-owned lender joined April's extra loan and supplied October's bridge on its own. A loan is not an equity stake, so no promise was broken outright. But a project pitched as private risk-taking now leans on a public lender to stay afloat.

1.5 Million, 1 Million, 640,000

The first-year target was 1.5 million visitors. The first 12 months delivered about 1 million, a total that also counts spa-only guests. Writing for President Online, Atsuo Nakayama, a sociologist who studies the entertainment industry, put the break-even line at roughly 900,000 to 1 million visitors. He estimates actual unique visitors at 600,000 to 800,000 once double counting with the spa is stripped out, which would put the park below that line.

The new plan starts from a much smaller park. JE expects about 640,000 visitors in its second year, to June 2027. EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, a rough measure of cash from operations) was a loss of 2.65 billion yen ($17 million) in the first year. Kyodo News reported that the plan narrows that to a loss of 1.36 billion yen ($8.6 million) in year two. Once restructuring is finished by spring 2027, the core target is EBITDA of 600 million yen ($3.8 million) on about 640,000 visitors a year. The levers: bringing outsourced operations in-house, resizing cleaning and maintenance contracts, and cutting staff numbers and advertising.

At the same time, the park is selling cheaper ways in. Since July 1, 2026, a short-stay ticket with one attraction has cost 2,970 yen (about $19) for adults, less than half the 6,930 yen (about $44) one-day pass for domestic residents. It sold well enough to become a regular ticket from October.

Junglia is trying to shift from a destination park to one stop on an Okinawa trip, earning money from fewer guests, many of them paying less. EBITDA also leaves out depreciation and interest. On a project financed with tens of billions of yen in loans, the figures reported so far do not show how debt payments fit into the plan.

The Planner and the Operator

Katana is JEHD's largest shareholder, and JE pays it to drive the business under an outsourcing contract. Kato declined to discuss the contract but said fees go through the board. At the September 25 shareholders' meeting, Morioka apologized. At that meeting and at the reconvened session on October 30, shareholders questioned Katana's responsibility and its consulting fees, the Yomiuri reported. Morioka did not speak at the reconvened meeting. Afterward he told reporters the talks had been sincere and that things would move forward.

Kato drew a line between the two companies. Many people assume JE is Katana, or that Morioka effectively runs it, he said, and that is wrong: the final decisions and the final responsibility rest with him. JE will keep pressing Katana on responsibility, he said, though for now the focus is restructuring and finding investors. The relationship with Katana will come up for discussion when a new sponsor is chosen, and the fate of the current management will be left to the new investors.

The arrangement has drawn criticism that the park is a business run on taxpayers' money. When the Cool Japan Fund announced its stake in Katana, it named the Okinawa theme park project among the businesses it was backing. Katana in turn is the largest shareholder in JEHD, the operator's parent, and collects fees from JE. J-CAST News counted about 11.4 billion yen ($72 million) in public equity, loans and subsidies whose amounts can be confirmed. Equity and loans are not the same, though. The state lender's money is meant to be repaid, ahead of other creditors. The money more likely to be lost is the Cool Japan Fund's stake. And Kato, who says JE will press Katana on responsibility, is himself one of Katana's founding members; as of November 2026, Katana's website still lists him as a senior partner.

Paris, 1994

Euro Disney opened outside Paris in April 1992 and kept owing fees to its parent while losing heavily. In its first full fiscal year, to September 1993, it lost 5.34 billion francs ($905 million at the time), the Associated Press reported.

The 1994 rescue included an interest holiday and a moratorium on the management fees and royalties that Euro Disney owed Walt Disney Co., according to CFO.com. Saudi Arabia's Prince Alwaleed bin Talal took a stake of about 24%, Global Finance reported.

Euro Disney was far larger and had Disney's characters and brand behind it. Junglia has no famous characters to fall back on. The overlap is narrow: an operator paying fees to its planner, and a rescue that depends on fresh capital. Nakayama argues that pulling out early makes no sense, pointing out that even Disney began with failure.

In Paris, the rescue stopped the fees flowing to the parent company. Junglia had no new sponsor as of October 2026, and whether Katana's fees and role change will be decided in those talks.

When a park sells expectations and falls short, who should carry the loss: the people who planned it, the people who ran it, or the people who put up the money? When a big project failed where you live, who ended up paying?

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